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The United Kingdom recently reacted against the International Court of Justice’s
Advisory Opinion on the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius. Has
the UK abandoned the international rule of law?
A unanimous verdict sows division
On 25 February 2019, the ICJ handed down its Advisory Opinion on the UK’s
separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius on 8 November 1965.
The Opinion stated clearly that the excision of Chagos from Mauritius, which at
that time had been a British colony, amounted to a violation of the customary
right of self-determination of Mauritius (paras 170-174 of the Opinion). The UK’s
retention of the Archipelago to this day constituted an unlawful act of continuing
character which engaged the UK’s international state responsibility (para. 177). The
Court’s substantive decision enjoyed near unanimous support in the Court. The
secondary opinions solely disagreed on procedural matters, notably discretion, or
the extent of the ruling (Declaration of Judge Tomka, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Donoghue, and Declaration of Judge Gevorgian). The United Nations General
Assembly subsequently endorsed the Court’s Opinion in Resolution 73/295 and
demanded that the UK withdraw its administration from Chagos until 22 November
2019. The Resolution was adopted with 116 votes in favour, 6 against (Australia,
Hungary, Israel, Maldives, the US, and the UK), and 56 abstentions.
Much has been written on the Court’s Opinion, both before and after it was delivered
(see Questions of International Law Zoom Out or Stephen Allen, Jan Klabbers,
and Kanad Bagchi). Even more remains uncertain and controversial: sovereignty
over the Chagos Archipelago and the US’ complicity in the wrongful act and the
consequences thereof, to name but two such instances. A variety of these open
issues will be addressed in an edited volume which Jamie Trinidad of Cambridge
University and I myself currently compose. However, the UK’s reaction to the Court’s
Opinion and the GA’s Resolution calls for an immediate response.
British imprudence and inaccuracy
Whereas it hesitated initially, the UK finally came out against the Court’s Opinion.
Three aspects of the UK’s reaction are particularly striking.
It is one thing (i) for the UK to say that it continues to enjoy sovereignty over the
Chagos Archipelago (statement in the GA, p. 10). That may be true, irrespective of
Judge Xue’s declaration to the contrary (para. 14; for more nuance, see Thomas
Dale Grant in Allen/Monaghan). Even after the Court’s Opinion, the UK could still
hold territorial title over Chagos. An opinion of the Court could, in any case, not
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transfer sovereignty, even if it were binding, and neither could a GA or a Security
Council resolution – see only Kosovo or South West Africa. Sovereignty the UK thus
may have – but comply with its obligations it must. Notably, it should have complied
with the obligation under decolonization to hand over the islands to Mauritius. The
failure to do hand them over engages the UK’s responsibility for violation of an
international obligation. In order to end this breach, the UK must transfer sovereignty
over Chagos to Mauritius “as rapidly as possible” (para. 178 of the Opinion). The
obligations the UK owes to the US with regard to the joint military facility on Diego
Garcia cannot possibly transmute the law in this regard (see the UK allegation in the
GA on p. 11).
It is, of course, also true (ii) that the Court’s Opinion is not binding. It is, however,
not a prudent decision for the UK to adopt this defence (in the GA on p. 11). Doing
so consigns it to a camp with the likes of Russia and China – which at one point
felt compelled to declare their continuing faith in international law – along with the
apartheid regime in South Africa. It is a formalist position that lays bare ignorance
of the subtleties of international law. International law consists of more than binding
obligations (see Judge Simma’s declaration in Kosovo). “Soft law”, including the
Court’s Opinion, cannot simply be ignored – unless one wishes to resurrect the
1920s (as in Lotus). Such a stance also undermines the strength of an Opinion
adopted with near-unanimity as well as the will of an overwhelming majority in the
GA. There is no doubt that this posture, if maintained, will lie heavy on the UK in
years to come.
It is an entirely different thing (iii), though, that some of the statements the UK
made on the law are misleading, if not downright wrong. The UK stated that the
UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, which had dealt with the UK’s establishment of a
marine protected area in Chagos, found that the understanding which the UK had
arranged with Mauritius on 5 November 1965 was legally binding (see the UK’s
statement in the GA, pp. 10 and 11, and the statement of the Minister of State in
a Westminster Hall Debate, para. 3). This is inaccurate. The Tribunal in its Award
held the understanding only to be binding on the United Kingdom (paras 421-448).
Neither is the UK’s complaint correct that the International Court of Justice “did not
take account of the 1965 agreement with Mauritius or the numerous affirmations of
that agreement made by Mauritius since independence” (para. 7 of the Minister’s
statement). In fact, the Court after a detailed review of the situation stated in para.
172: “Having reviewed the circumstances in which the Council of Ministers of the
colony of Mauritius agreed in principle to the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago
on the basis of the Lancaster House agreement, the Court considers that this
detachment was not based on the free and genuine expression of the will of the
people concerned.” The Court then concluded: “the UK, as the administering Power,
[is required] to respect the territorial integrity of that country, including the Chagos
Archipelago” (para. 173) and “the process of decolonization of Mauritius was not
lawfully completed when Mauritius acceded to independence in 1968” (para. 174).
Finally, it remains unclear why the Court should have addressed “the fact that the UK
and US have entered into a binding treaty obligation to maintain UK sovereignty over
the whole territory until at least 2036” (para. 7 of the Minister’s statement; similar in
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the GA, p. 11). After all, how could an obligation between the UK and the US alter
anything with regard to the obligation owed to Mauritius under international law?
There is further spin in the UK’s statements. For instance, the UK points to how
“Mauritius had circumvented the principle that the ICJ should consider bilateral
disputes only with the consent of the states” (para. 9 of the Minister’s statement). But
was it not the General Assembly, rather than Mauritius, that requested the advisory
opinion from the Court?
For all intents, one cannot help but be struck by what the UK’s Minister asserted
towards the end of a statement: “I say very clearly that the UK continues to be seen
as one of the most prominent international champions of the rule of law across the
globe” (para. 12). Who, at present, sees such a champion in the UK, but for the
UK itself? Its government is manifestly prone to illusions of grandeur. But in truth,
Britannia no longer rules the waves – it waives the rules, as Patrick Grady aptly put it
(para. 23 of his statement).
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